It determines the circumstances in which promises made by the parties to a contract shall be legally binding on them.
On July 20,the respondent, Dhurmodas Ghose, executed a mortgage in favour of Brahmo Dutt, a money-lender carrying on business at Calcutta and elsewhere, to secure the repayment of Rs. The amount actually advanced is in dispute. At that time the respondent was an infant; and he did not attain twenty-one until the month of September following.
Throughout the transaction Brahmo Dutt was absent from Calcutta, and the whole business was carried through for him by his attorney, Kedar Nath Mitter, the money being found by Dedraj, the local manager of Brahmo Dutt.
While considering the proposed advance, Kedar Nath received information that the respondent was still a minor; and on July 15,the following letter was written and sent to him by Bhupendra Nath Bose, an attorney: Jogendranundinee Dasi, the mother and guardian appointed by the High Court under its letters patent of the person and property of Babu Dhurmodas Ghose, that a mortgage of the properties of the said Babu Dhurmodas Ghose is being prepared from your office.
I am instructed to give you notice, which I hereby do, that the said Babu Dhurmodas Ghose is still an infant under the age of twenty-one, and any one lending money to him will do so at his own risk and peril. On the day on which the mortgage was executed, Kedar Nath got the infant to sign a long declaration, which, he had prepared for him, containing a statement that he came of age on June 17; and that Babu Dedraj and Brahmo Dutt, relying on his assurance that he had attained his majority, had agreed to advance to him Rs.
There is conflicting evidence as to the time when and circumstances under which that declaration was obtained; but it is unnecessary to go into this, as both Courts below have held that Kedar Nath did not act upon, and was not misled by, that statement, and was fully aware at the time the mortgage was executed of the minority of the respondent.
On September 10,the infant, by his mother and guardian as next friend, commenced this action against Brahmo Dutt, stating that he was under age when he executed the mortgage, and praying for a declaration that it was void and inoperative, and should be delivered up to be cancelled.
The defendant, Brahmo Dutt, put in a defence that the plaintiff was of full age when he executed the mortgage; that neither he nor Kedar Nath had any notice that the plaintiff was then an infant; that, even if he was a minor, the declaration as to his age was fraudulently made to deceive the defendant, and disentitled the plaintiff to any relief; and that in any case the Court should not grant the plaintiff any relief without making him repay the moneys advanced.
By a further statement the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had subsequently ratified the mortgage; but this case wholly failed, and is not the subject of appeal. And the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal from him. Subsequently to the institution of the present appeal Brahmo Dutt died, and this appeal has been prosecuted by his executors.
The first of the appellants' reasons in support of the present appeal is that the Courts below were wrong in holding that the knowledge of Kedar Nath must be imputed to the defendant.
In their Lordships' opinion they were obviously right. The defendant was absent from Calcutta, and personally did not take any part in the transaction. It was entirely in charge of Kedar Nath, whose full authority to act as he did is not disputed.
He stood in the place of the defendant for the purposes of this mortgage; and his acts and knowledge were the acts and knowledge of his principal.
It was contended that Dedraj, the defendant's gomastha, was the real representative in Calcutta of the defendant, and that he had no knowledge of the plaintiff's minority.
But there is nothing in this. He no doubt made the advance out of the defendant's funds. The section is as follows: When one person has by his declaration act or omission intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed in any suit or proceeding between himself and such person or his representative to deny the truth of that thing.
They consider it clear that the section does not apply to a case like the present, where the statement relied upon is made to a person who knows the real facts and is not misled by the untrue statement. There can be no estoppel where the truth of the matter is known to both parties, and their Lordships hold, in accordance with English authorities, that a false representation, made to a person who knows it to be false, is not such a fraud as to take away the privilege of infancy: The point most pressed, however, on behalf of the appellants was that the Courts ought not to have decreed in the respondent's favour without ordering him to repay to the appellants the sum of Rs.
And in support of this contention s. When a person at whose option a contract is voidable rescinds it, the other party thereto need not perform any promise therein contained of which he is promisor.
The party rescinding a voidable contract shall, if he have received any benefit thereunder from another party to such contract, restore such benefit, so far as may be, to the person from whom it was received. The general current of decision in India certainly is that ever since the passing of the Indian Contract Act IX, of the contracts of infants are voidable only.
This conclusion, however, has not been arrived at without vigorous protests by various judges from time to time; nor indeed without decisions to the contrary effect. Under these circumstances, their Lordships consider themselves at liberty to act on their own view of the law as declared by the Contract Act, and they have thought it right to have the case reargued before them upon this point.
They do not consider it necessary to examine in detail the numerous decisions above referred to, as in their opinion the whole question turns upon what is the true construction of the Contract Act itself. It is necessary, therefore, to consider carefully the terms of that Act; but before doing so it may be convenient to refer to the Transfer of Property Act IV ofs.
That is the Act under which the present mortgage was made, and it is merely dealing with persons competent to contract; and s. The present case, therefore, falls within the provisions of the latter Act. Then, to turn to the Contract Act, s.
This is clearly borne out by later sections in the Act. The question whether a contract is void or voidable presupposes the existence of a contract within the meaning of the Act, and cannot arise in the case of an infant.
Their Lordships are, therefore, of opinion that in the present case there is not any such voidable contract as is dealt with in s. A new point was raised here by the appellants' counsel, founded on s. It is sufficient to say that this section, like s. It was further argued that the preamble of the Act shewed that the Act was only intended to define and amend certain parts of the law relating to contracts, and that contracts by infants were left outside the Act.
If this were so, it does not appear how it would help the appellants.Oct 17, · Calming Soothing Sleeping Music, Piano Relaxation Tranquility 24/7 - Yoga, Meditation, Study Jason Stephenson - Sleep . Dharmodas Ghose CASE (). BRIEF FACTS- Dharmodas Ghose, a minor, entered into a contract for borrowing a sum of Rs.
20, out of which the lender paid the minor a sum of Rs. 8,The minor executed mortgage of property in favour of the lender. Subsequently, the . MOHIRI BIBEE VS DHARMODAS GHOSE Brahmo Dutt was a money-lender and carrying his business in Calcutta and elsewhere.
Dharmo Dass, a minor entered into a contract with Brahmo Dutt. Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose. CASE BRIEF. The plaintiff, Dharmodas Ghose, while he was a minor, mortgaged his property in favour of the defendant, Brahmo Dutt, who was a moneylender to secure a loan of Rs. 20, The actual amount of loan given was less than Rs.
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MOHORI BIBEE VS DRAHMOS GHOSH 1. MMoohhoorrii BBiibbeeee vv.. About the Case • The Dharmodas Ghose lent the MINOR the sum of 20, rupees at 12% interest and secured the loan by way of mortgage executed by the MINOR in favor of the.
Dharmodas Ghose CASE (). BRIEF FACTS- Dharmodas Ghose, a minor, entered into a contract for borrowing a sum of Rs. 20, out of which the lender paid the minor a sum of Rs.